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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WILLIAM B. HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v.
GENAVE H. TANNER, GRACE H.
McPHIE, BANNIE H. DURFEE,
and GRANT H. HARRIS,
Defendants-Respondents,

Case No. 16810

and

JAMES H. HARRIS,
Plaintiff in Intervention-Respondent,

v.
WILLIAM B. HARRIS,
Defendant in Intervention-Appellant,
etc.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
The above consolidated cases Nos. C-8326 and C-8984
arose out of a partnership between James H. Harris, now deceased,
and his son William B. Harris, appellant, and involve the identification of partnership property, accounting and the winding-up
of partnership affairs.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After trial of the matters the court below made and entered
a judgment determining the value and possession of the property of

the -
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B. Harris Partnership, the disposition

-2thereof, determined that William B. Harris be ordered to pay to the
estate of James H. Harris the difference between the valued amounts
of the personal property held by the parties, i.e. , that William B,1

Harris pay to the Estate of James H. Harris the sum of $8,243.50, ·
denied further partnership accounting, and declared that there had

i:

been a winding-up of the affairs of the partnership and that Willia

;·
1

B. Harris had no further claim against the Estate of James H. Harri:;
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents request that the judgment of the District
Court be affirmed in all respects.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

James H. Harris and his son William B. Harris, hereinafter::::

referred to as "James" and "William", became partners in the oper- ...
ation of a livestock and farming business in the 1930's, which

partnership is herein referred to as the "Harris-Harris" partnershiJ:::
Subsequent to that time the Harris' entered into a partnership
with Wilton and Merrill Fidler, the "Harris-Fidler" partnership,
which partnership was dissolved by court decree in 1970.

William

~

subsequently filed suit No. C-8326 against his sisters and broth& -

alleging certain interferences and seeking damages and a restrainin'::J:
order.

In November, 1974, James intervened in that suit and claime'.:.

"'

ownership of certain lands that appeared on the records in Willid'~

name and certain personal property, and that William had defrauded ::..

'·

him.

In May, 19 7 5, James died and the probate -proceeding (No· 355 2~,

was filed (R. 3552 - p.3).

In November, 1976, William filed his

second suit, No. 8984, against the personal representatives of the
estate
for
accounting
for
the provided
Harris-Harris
partnership
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-3and for the winding-up of the partnership business (R. 8984 - p.8).
The above three cases were consolidated for trial and
were tried before Hon. Bryant H. Croft, who wrote a detailed memorandum decision, dated November 3, 1977

(R. 8984, pp. 110-90),

which the parties stipulated would be considered findings of fact
and conclusions of law (R. 8326, pp.62-61).

Judge Croft's judgment

dated December 14, 1977, based on the findings and conclusions
determined that James and William were partners, that they were equal
partners in the Harris-Fidler partnership, that William individually
owned certain land and that other land was partnership land, that
certain designated and described personal property was partnership
property (R. 8326, pp. 69-62).

The Court determined that the

assets of the Harris-Harris partnership consisted of thosed items
itemized in Appellant's Brief at pp. 4-5 together with those items
fully depreciated in the partnership depreciation schedule which
were on hand at the end of 1970; all Bureau of Land Management
grazing permits; all property which came to James and William from
the Harris-Fidler partnership upon its dissolution; certain
cashier's checks; and certain lands in Tooele County.

The Court

gave judgment to William for $5,287.50 for William's on-half of the
proceeds from the sale of certain grazing permits and directed that
the cashier's checks be cashed and the proceeds be equally divided.
All claims and counterclaims for money damages asserted by the
parties in the civil cases and for attorneys frees and costs were
dismissed.

It was also ordered that:

"6. All monies contained in the James H. Harris
bank accounts as testified to by Genave H. Tanner
including those funds transferred by be before the
death of James H. Harris, shall be accounted for
by the co-executrices in the probate estate.
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-4"7.
That the claims of the Estate of James Henry
Harris, Deceased, against William B. Harris and the
claims of William B. Harris against the Estate of
James H. Harris for an accounting for income received
from the farming and sheep businesses conducted by
the partnership through the years 1972 to 1974,
inclusive, are dismissed, as the income tax returns
show that the partners had approximately equal receipts.
"8. Only one-half of the assets that came out of
the Harris-Fidler partnership and one-half of the
assets of hte James Henry Harris and William B. Harris
partnership, are assets of the estate of James Henry
Harris, deceased, and are subject to probate, and none
of the interest of William B. Harris in such partnership
assets are subject to the obligations or expenses of
said estate."
(R. 8326, p.64)
It is significant to note that the trial on

the above matter was

held July 6, 1977, two years after the death of James.

That trial

specifically determined the assets of the Harris-Harris partnership
as shown above.

No appeal was taken from Judge Croft's judgment.

In July, 19 7 8, William filed a motion in the consolidated

cases as mentioned in Appellant's Brief at pp. 6-7 seeking various:
forms of relief.

In September, 1978, the respondents filed their

objections to William's motion (R. 8984, pp. 129-126) and filed
a list of items of personal property in the possession of the
Estate of James (R. 8984, pp. 132-130).
The motions were set for trial before the Honorable David:
Winder and trial was held June 19

&

20, 1979.

At the outset of the:

trial counsel for Appellant indicated that he sought at the heari~~
to wind-up the partnership affairs

(Trans. p.3) and complete the

areas unresolved by Judge Croft's earlier decision (Trans. P· 4).
Counsel for the respondents urged that all areas unresolved by the
earlier decision other than those specifically identified by Judge
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library
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-5that

with the exception of the 1971 depreciation schedule all

accounting had been completed (Trans. pp. 6-14).
Initially, the Court disagreed with respondents' contention
and allowed evidence to come in (Trans. pp.14-116).

After further

review of Judge Croft's earlier decision, Judge Winder reversed
himself and ruled that:
" [I] t appears to me that all we ought to be concerned
with as far as the partnership is concerned is the
property listed on the Depreciation Schedules in 1971.
As you know, he listed the 1970 and '71 Depreciation
Schedules and then he indicated that purchased in 1971
and on the '71 schedule were five other items. And
then at page 7 of his decision, he says that any
personal property formerly included in the Depreciation
Schedules that had been fully depreciated by 1970
would also be partnership property.
"So in other words, it seems to me that all we are
talking about, really, is what is listed on the
Depreciation Schedules plus personal property fully
depreciated prior thereto. And he specifically said
that the $5,287.50 settled it, squared the account
through 1974."
(Trans. 6/19/79, p. 117)
Judge Winder than inquired of counsel for Appellant whether "we
are here on the probate estate?"

(Trans. p.117), which was responded

to affirmatively, whereas Appellant in his Point 2 denies that the
court had jurisdiction to make the ruling regarding the probate
estate.
The judgment appealed from, that of Judge Winder dated
November 8, 1979, held that Judge Croft had determined the assets
of the partnership to be accounted for were those as referred to
in the quotation from the transcript above and declared that the
property~listed

in Paragraph l.a. of the Judgment was in the poss-

ession of William and had a value of $13,080.00, was Harris-Harris
partnership property, and that William has the right to retain
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
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in Paragraph l.b. of the Judgment was in the possession of the
James H. Harris Estate and had a value of $3,540.00, was HarrisHarris partnership porperty, and the the Estate has the right to
retain possession of those listed items; and declared that the
final distribution from the winding-up of the Harris-Harris partnership be made by William paying to the Estate of James the sum
of $8,243.50 (R. 8326, pp.106-102).

Judge Winder ordered that

the Harris-Harris partnership is, quoting from paragraph 7,
" ... hereby terminated, wound up and the assets
consisting of real and personal property are hereby
fully and completely designated and distributed to
the partners, their heirs and assigns.
This termination and distribution of all partnership property
both real and personal is inclusive of all the
proceeds of the Harris-Fidler Partnership terminated
in 1970, which proceeds are included in the distribution of the partnership property of James H. Harris
and William B. Harris.
"8. William B. Harris, as a partner and on behalf of
his partnership interest in the Harris-Fidler Partnership and in the James H. Harris and William B. Harris
Partnership, shall have no further claim whatsoever
on the Estate of James H. Harris; his partnership interests being fully adjudicated and determined in this
Court proceeding and the prior proceeding before
Judge Bryant H. Croft, on July 6, 1977, whose decision
was filed on or about November 3, 1977." (R.8326, p.103)
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE . COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLARING AND DETERMINING THAT •
THE ASSETS OF THE HARRIS-HARRIS PARTNERSHIP, INCLUDING THE PROCEEDS
FROM THE HARRIS-FIDLER PARTNERSHIP, HAVE BEEN FULLY AND COMPLETELY.
DESIGNATED AND DISTRIBUTED AND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A WINDING-UP
OF THE AFFAIRS OF THE HARRIS-HARRIS PARTNERSHIP.
Judge Croft's 1977 judgment is res judicata as to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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determination of the assets held and to be accounted for in the
Harris-Harris partnership.

Judge Croft's judgment was had on both

complaints brought by William Harris, the appellant herein.

The

Complaint in Civil No. 8984 sought a determination of the real and
personal property of the Harris partnerships, for an accounting,
for damages, for a stay in the proceedings of the James H. Harris
Estate pending determination of estate and partnership assets, for
damages and for other relief (R.8984, pp. 8-1).

The Complaint in

Civil No. 8326 sought an accounting by the respondents for partnership activities, a restraining order and damages.
were brought in 1976 and 1974, respectively.

The complaints

Trial was had on the

consolidated cases in 1977 before Judge Croft, James having earlier
intervened and the probate case being consolidated (R.8326, pp.69and R.3552, p.168)
63)j (In the probate proceeding, William contested the will of
James alleging undue influence on the part of the respondents (R.
3552, pp. 9-6).

William and the respondents herein engaged in

discovery of each other's positions and facts

(R.3552, pp. 16-18;

31-37; 59-64; 38-44; 45-58; 75-85; 65; 111; 263; 264; 265; 266;
and 267 {pp. 263-267 represent individual depositions, see index
to probate file)).

On September 23, 1976, the Special Administrator

of the James Harris Estate files a listing of receipts and expenditures in behalf of the estate (R.3552, pp. 141-127).

Demand for

Notice was filed by Appellant in the probate file on or about
July 6, 1977 (R.3552, p. 170).

Thereafter, on or about April 9,

1979, Respondents filed and served its "Petition for Determining
Heirship" (R. 3552, p. 200-195) and Notice of Hearing therefore
(R.3552, pp. 194-193).

William filed his response thereto

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(R.3552, p. 204) and the probate file otherwise shows activity
and familiarity on the part of all concerned with this appeal.)
The Appellant framed the issues in the case before
Judge Croft regarding the assets of the partnership.
Croft specifically ruled "That the assets of the

Judge

partnership~ ...

the items listed in Paragraph l.a. through e. of his judgment
(R.8326, pp.68-66).

This case presents a circumstance where the

same parties are involved, the same causes of action, issues that
were litigated in a prior action and in which judgment thereon
was rendered and the Appellant should not be allowed to raise
issues which were or should have been raised in the former action.
Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971).
Judge Winder properly rejected evidence regarding matters that were::
or should have been raised in the earlier action before Judge Croft.
This includes evidence regarding assets already mentioned herein

and those other assets -as mentioned in Appellant's Brief at pp. 8-9i.
Testimony was given at the trial before Judge Winder
regarding the bank accounts mentioned by Judge Croft.

It should

be particularly noted that Judge Croft did not include the funds
held at any time in bank accounts as partnership assets.
was that those funds were to be "accounted for".

His Ord~

That does not

mean that Appellant William Harris has, has had or may have or have
had any interest or claim whatsoever to those funds.

The order

requires only that an accounting be made in the probate estate.

At the trial before Judge Winder, Grace McPhie·testified regardi~ ~
the bank accounts and was cross-examined by counsel for Appellant
(Trans. 6/19/79, pp.77-86).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The Respondents alternatively allege in support of
the judgment rendered by Judge Winder that (1) such accounting
as was required by Judge Croft's decision was made at the trial
before Judge Winder, or (2) that the accounting as demanded by
Appellant is premature.
1.

The accounting has been made.

The parties agreed

at the outset of the Winder trial that all three cases, including
the probate case, were

b~fore

the court at that time and that it

was the desire of the parties to have all matters regarding the
partnership resolved at that hearing, as mentioned and referred to
earlier in this brief.

Respondents were examined regarding the bank

accounts and no evidence was adduced that the funds that were in
or had been in any of the accounts were partnership funds.

While

it appears from the transcript that Appellant probably would have
taken additional testimony regarding those accounts had Judge
Winder not reversed himself on the scope of the trial, Appellant
nevertheless failed to make a record showing in any manner that
the accounts were partly or wholly partnership funds and this Oourt
must therefore rule on what is in the record and upon the judgment
rendered, which by implication denies any right, title or interest
in the said funds to the Appellant,· the

Court having determined

apparently that either by the evidence presented, or by Appellant's
failure to produce other or additional evidence, or that by Judge
Croft's decision any such funds were not
assets.

part of the partnership's

(It may also be noted that no proffer of evidence was made

regarding the funds by Appellant so as to have a fully informed
court and preserve the point on appeal.

See, e.g., Cameron v. Boone

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2.

The demanded accounting is premature.

As mentioned,

Judge Croft's Order was that there be an accounting made in the
probate estate.

If the trial before Judge Winder is not deemed

to have met that requirement in spite of the representations and
desires of counselr then it must be seen that the matters before
Judge Winder were for a determination of partnership assets only,
was only a preliminary step in determining what assets were in
the Estate so that a later accounting could be made and was not
the probate action wherein the accounting was to be rendered.
The Appellant claims, beginning at page 17 of his brief:
"The winding of [sic] the Harris-Harris partnership affairs
has been irregular and contrary to law from the beginning."
Appellant has not at any time in the courts below made such a

cla~

nor in any manner relied on, mentioned or alleged the statutes and
case law presented in his brief on appeal.

~

by and through Road Commission v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d
What does appear clearly is that at James' death in May,

.1975, dissolved such partnership as may have existed theretofore
between James and William.

Utah Code Ann. §48-1-28(4), which

restates the common-law rule that absent a contrary agreement, a
partnership is dissolved

by

the death of a partner.

agreement has ever been alleged or proved.

No contrary

The subsequent judgment

have specified the extent of partnership assets and properly "wou~
up" the partnership.

:~

It is well-settled that' 1:

matters not raised in trial cannot be considered on appeal.

817.

1

The judgment of the trial court should be

affirmed as to that winding-up of affairs and distribution decree.
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POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT WILLIAM
" ... SHALL HAVE NO FURTHER CLAIM WHATSOEVER ON THE
ESTATE OF JAMES H. HARRIS."
William B. Harris, Appellant herein, made and filed a
"Withdrawal of Objections and Waiver of Interest" purporting to
waive any and all objections to the interpretation of the James H.
Harris will, to the determination of heirship, of any interest
in the will of James H. Harris or to take as an heir pursuant to
the terms and conditions of that will, to further proceedings in
regard to the probate of the will or the accounting thereof,
excepting his interest as a Creditor/Claimant pursuant to the
terms and conditions of his claim against the Estate of James H.
Harris subsequent to a trial on July 6, 1977, for the consolidated
cases of Civil No. 8326, Civil No. 8984, and Probate No. 3552
(R. 3552, pp. 207-206).

That waiver appears to be in accord with

the judgment of the Court and should be dispositive of the matter.
In the event, however, that the waiver is not dispositive,
Respondents argue as follows.

The language used in an opinion

must be read in light of the problems addressed therein.
Estate v. Nielson, 107 Utah 564, 155 P.2d 968, 972.
Order reads

Nielson's

Judge Winder's

as follows:

"8. William B. Harris, as a partner and on behalf of
his partnership interest in the Harris-Fidler Partnership
and'in the James H. Harris and William G. Harris partnership, shall have no further claim whatsoever on the estate
of James H. Harris; his partnership interests being fully
adjudicated and determined in this Court proceeding and
the prior proceeding before Judge Bryant H. Croft, on
July 7, 1977, whose decision was filed on or about
November 3, 1977.. (R. 8326, p. 103) (Emphasis added).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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arise out of the partnerships mentioned and it is simply a restate·
ment of the other provisions of the judgment determining interests
of the parties and winding up the affairs.

Further, it is con-

sistent with the Court having received the accounting of the bank
deposit funds or with a determination that those funds were not
partnership property.

Judge Winder was clearly apprised of Judge

Croft's decision as he mentions many times throughout the arguments,.
On Appellant's hearing on his Objections of Draft Order of
Accounting, Distribution and Termination of October 29, 1979,
(Trans. 10/29/79) the Court again mentioned that it had read and
re-read Judge Croft's Order and that the few issues left by Judge
Croft had been dealt with at the June, 1979, trial before Judge
Winder.

Judge Winder stated that:

"[W]hat I intended to do, and this is such a complex
matter and I know nobody is satisfied but we can't litigat(
it time after time after time, and I 've gone back and read
Judge Croft's decision again today, or partially read it,
and I had read it about three or four times, and I reiterated again and again at the June 19th-20th hearing that
I thought there were just a few issues that had been left
by Judge Crofte
It was my idea that they were dealt wiW
on June 19th and 20th, and the only sense in which I
think the probate matter remains open is simply that-that I wasn't dealing with the probate matter in the sense
of decreeing the distribution but I certainly--i t was not
my intention that you [Appellant herein] come back now
in the probate matter. And if it hasn't been decided a~
relitigated in the probate matter, what I decided ~t the
19th and 20th trial, because that was the opportunity W
try all of these issues about the partnership and whether
hay or wheat or equipment or anything else belonged. And
as Judge Croft noted when he decided this and as was so
apparent to me, to go back and try and reconstruct thi~S
in this complicated situation after years have gone by
and memories have faded and records are gone, it is
virtually an impossibility. And I'll be the first to
acknowledge that maybe what I did at the end of the June
19-20 hearing may seem a little arbitrary but I think
there's such a great advantage to laying this matter to
rest, and I tried to do it as fairly as I could.
(Trans.
10/29/79,
pp.
17-18)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The effect of Judge Winder's ruling is not to cut
William off from the Estate of James or to adjust the accounts
of the probate estate with William but simply and solely determines
that William has no further claims against the Estate based on
the partnerships interests that William had.
The Appellant alludes to §75-3-1001 as being ignored in
the closing of the Estate (Appellant's Brief at p. 26) whereas
the Estate has not yet been closed and the trials before Judges
Croft and Winder were preliminary to the closing of the estate
and necessary to determine what the estate consists of.

The

Appellant has had two separate "days in Court" to resolve the
disputes regarding the partnership properties, has had ample
opportunity to litigate its issues and should not be allowed to
relitigate issues it did or should have properly litigated in the
trials below.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed

Respectfully submitted,
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